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Exploring the law in medieval minds: the duty of the legal historian to write the books of non-written 
law 
 
D. Heirbaut (University of Ghent) 
 
 A good start for any discussion on the methodology of legal history is Peter Landau’s 
statement that there is no ‘methodological king’s road’ for research in the field of legal history.1 
There may be colleagues who do not agree, but most legal historians will admit that several 
approaches are possible and that this methodological diversity is a strength, not a weakness. 
However, it also means that it is impossible to deal with all the methodologies of legal history2 and 
that one has to limit oneself to a few. The choices one makes depend of one’s personal interests and 
training, the relevant source material and so on. The following will present just one of the many 
possibilities and it should be understood here that there is no claim at all that this is the best or even 
worse, the only possible approach. Thinking differently would even be unwise, as, for reasons which 
will be made clear, what is sketched below is only valid for one type of legal history.  
 
The growing importance of the study of medieval customary law 
 
 The success story of legal history in the recent past has been the study of the ius commune 
because it can be a model for the new common law of Europe we are now creating.3 Some 
enthusiasts reduced the argument to something like ‘Europe had one law in the past, Roman law, 
and it will have one law once again, thus it is a good idea to let the old law serve as a source of 
inspiration for the new one’. This distorts the historical reality, as there was never one law for 
Europe, in the sense of one set of legal rules which was applied allover the continent. Lawyers just 
had a common toolbox, which included one language, Latin, common sources, the Corpus iuris, 
shared authoritative works, terminology, methodology and so on.4 Seeing that the focus of the 
creators of the new common law of Europe has now shifted to developing a ‘common frame of 
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reference’5 it seems that some specialists of current law now correctly understand the nature of the 
old ius commune.  
 However, there is another mistaken interpretation of the old ius commune, which also has 
great implications for the new common law of Europe, as many lawyers and even legal historians 
overestimate the European character of the ius commune. In the Middle Ages the ius commune was 
only European if one takes its canon law component into account, because the use of Roman law was 
mainly a Mediterranean phenomenon. This does not mean that one cannot find specialists of Roman 
law or references to it outside the Mediterranean, but their role remained limited compared to 
indigenous law and even when local customary law became more sophisticated this was not always 
or not solely due to the example of the ius commune, but more to a general development  in 
society.6 In fact, the same mechanism was at work in the Mediterranean. The existing law remained 
in place, but it received an upgrade, as vulgar Roman law developed into the learned ius commune. 
In short, the Mediterranean opted for the ius commune, because it was already using its basic 
version. The story changes around 1500 because then several countries in Europe adopted the ius 
commune and even those which stuck more strongly to their indigenous law may have been more 
influenced by the learned law than was hitherto thought.7 Yet, this break-through of the ius 
commune goes hand in hand with a growing ‘nationalisation’ and the term ius commune itself may 
refer more to a common national than to a common European law.8 In fact, whether in the Middle 
Ages or in the Early Modern era, the ius commune was always a Janus bifrons, very much like the 
current Euro coins, which have a European, but also a national side. It would be ignoring historical 
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reality if one denied the importance of the ius commune, but the same also holds for ignoring local, 
regional or national law and this has profound repercussions for current debates.9 
 Amending the argument of the return of the ius commune, it should be stressed that not only 
the common European law is making a come-back, but also regional law. One can point here to this 
author’s native Belgium, in which the demise of French law has not resulted in the creation of a 
national Belgian law, but rather in the development of two distinct mentalities in each part of the 
country.10 However, many other examples can be given, like the fact that in Spain the region of 
Catalonia has its own civil code.11 Given that not only Europe’s past unity, but also its diversity is 
returning, it stands to reason that the latter should also be studied. Needless to say, this is no plea 
for a regional legal history which would try to support new myths of regional identities, but only for a 
legal history which would look to both sides, unity and diversity, of the old law, to understand it 
better and to cope with the current situation. Using legal history to forge a new regional identity in 
law would be doomed to failure in many cases anyway, as the old regions do, in many cases, not 
correspond to the new ones, with as the best example the disappearance of Prussia.12 Even if an old 
name is used this may be misleading. For example, Flanders, the Dutch speaking part of today’s 
Belgium, took its name from the medieval county of Flanders, but three of the five current provinces 
of Flanders never belonged to the historical Flanders, which did encompass, however, most of the 
French département du Nord, and also for some time, the Département du Pas-de-Calais.  
 
The problem of studying customary law before the advent of authoritative books 
 
Unfortunately, outside England, the ius commune takes a lion’s share of the attention of 
those legal historians who do not study the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.13 After all, it is 
understandable that the Champions League of the ius commune will attract more fans than the 
regional series of indigenous law. The audience, and thus the acclaim one can receive for one’s 
achievements, is bigger and the facilities are better. One has good surveys14 and reference works,15 
                                                          
9
  See D. Heirbaut and M.E. Storme, ‘Historical evolution of European private law’, in 
C. Twigg-Flesner, The Cambridge companion to European Union private law, (Cambridge 
University press, 2010), 32. 
10
  D. Heirbaut and M.E. Storme, ‘The Belgian legal tradition: from a long quest for legal 
independence to a longing for independence’, European Review of Private Law (2006), 645-
683. 
11
  See more in general, H. Macqueen, A. Vaquer and S. Espiau Espiau (eds.), Regional 
private laws and codification in Europe (Cambridge University press, 2003). 
12
  C. Clark, Iron kingdom: the rise and fall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (London: Penguin, 
2006). 
13
  For example, English legal historians are publishing a 13 volume Oxford history of the 
laws of England. German legal historians can just as proudly point to the 8 volume H. Coing 
(ed.), Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren Europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, 
(Munich: Beck, 1973-1988) and many other publications of Coing and his team, but these 
concern the ius commune, not just German legal history. 
14
  H. Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, I (Munich: Beck, 1985); H. Lange and M. 
Kriechbaum, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter (Munich: Beck, 1997-2007), 2 vol.  
the sources are in Latin and many of them are available in good editions, or at least one can easily 
find a manuscript. Specialists of customary law can sometimes profit from this because the ius 
commune and customary law were in many ways complementary. It was not unusual for an author 
influenced by the ius commune to describe regional law using the terminology and techniques of the 
learned law. English16 law was precocious in that this already happened in the thirteenth century, but 
sometimes the process could take much longer. For example, in the Low Countries the first great 
local author to use the benefits of Roman law only appeared at the end of the fifteenth century.17 
However, sometimes local lawyers had already written their own books without any benefit of 
formal schooling.18 Thus, whether written by these semi-professionals or by their university trained 
brethren, from a certain point in time the legal historian has an authority from the past at his 
disposal. He will expand upon it and criticise it, but he always has a starting point and a safety net 
and its importance cannot be overrated, though it has been in at least one case. Susan Reynolds links 
the origins of the feudalism to specialised authors, more in particular the learned lawyers of the ius 
commune.19 In this view, feudal law cannot exist without a doctrine. 
However, there is no doubt that law flourished in Europe before books described it, unless of 
course one would use a definition of what constitutes law which no lawyer today would accept.20 The 
problem is only that, unlike the ius commune, it was not a product of legal scholarship, but of legal 
practice, which means that ‘theoretical’ sources are lacking. For example one can take feudal law in 
the medieval county of Flanders from 1000 to 1300. There are almost no contemporary sources 
describing what Flemish feudalism should have been in that period. Feudal legislation in Flanders is a 
phenomenon of the later middle ages,21 with only a few earlier traces during the high middle ages. 
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Some accounts of Flemish feudal customs exist, but their value is limited: they appear only at the end 
of the thirteenth century and only in three places: Lille,22 Cassel23 and Scheldewindeke.24 Moreover 
they are still very primitive, chaotic and most of all incomplete. They mainly concern themselves with 
issues which had led to court disputes, not with other practices. In fact, they are more interesting for 
studying how local feudal courts and the semi-professionals active in them functioned than for 
studying substantive feudal law.25 As far as the distinction of law in the books and law in action is 
concerned only the former exists. 
 
The task of the legal historian: to write a restatement of legal customs 
 
 In the context of sources which only contain the law in action, the legal historian faces other 
challenges than his colleagues who dispose of authoritative contemporary works. He cannot, for 
example, study the life of law professors or analyse their manuscripts. Most of all, he cannot check 
whether a book is accurate in describing contemporary law. However, does this mean that he just 
has to stay with his charters and narrative sources, only recounting what they tell, so that his 
colleagues might just as well take a shortcut and read the sources themselves? The legal historian 
should be aware here that he is not the only one confronted by this problem. Specialists of 
contemporary law in countries without codifications are, mutatis mutandis, confronted with the 
same problem. They can work with individual cases, but they can also try to distil general principles 
from the body of case law. In the United States the latter has even taken the form of restatements of 
the law by the American Law Institute,26 which have become quasi codifications. European lawyers 
have followed this approach, with several commissions of lawyers trying to write down the 
‘principles’ of a field, with the principles of contract law by the so-called Lando commission as the 
best example.27 
 Likewise, one can think of the task of the legal historian confronted with a law without books, 
to write such a restatement, though his activity would be very different from that of his colleagues of 
the American Law Institute or the commissions in Europe. For example, both today’s restatements 
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and the legal historian’s books are theoretical constructs, but the latter will always remain just that, 
whereas the former, if successful, will move beyond that stage. If the law practitioners accept them 
as an authority, it will be law instead of just a description of it,28 whereas the legal historian’s work 
will never be more than his theoretical construct. However extensive the research into the sources, it 
will never be or become the historical reality. 
 For better understanding this construct, it would be good to work with two concepts, one 
from comparative law, one from general legal history and since recently also legal theory. In the late 
1960’s German legal historians started a debate on the concept of law in the middle ages, which is 
still going on. One point on which agreement has been reached is, that better to indicate that the 
middle ages were different one should not use the concept of Gewohnheitsrecht (customary law), 
but of Rechtsgewohnheiten (‘legal customs’). The foreign researcher wanting a concise and clear 
definition will, however, be bewildered.29 There is consensus about some aspects, most of all that 
Rechtsgewohnheiten belong to a different context in which state activity was lacking and in which 
people had another, non-normative, understanding of law, which was not completely distinguished 
from religion, practice, morals and language and transmitted orally. Beyond that, every legal 
historian has fleshed out the concept of Rechtsgewohnheiten according to his views. The reason for 
these variations on the common theme will be explained below, but they cannot be studied here. For 
now, it is important just to note that a restatement of a non-Roman law during the high middle ages 
will not contain principles, but Rechtsgewohnheiten, with the generally accepted connotations 
entailed.  
Comparative law, or rather the comparative lawyer Ewald, offers a second useful concept, 
‘law in minds’.30 The pair law in the books - law in action fails as an analytical tool, as there is also the 
‘law in minds’, the framework lawyers use. This concept should be used in conjunction with the 
Rechtsgewohnheiten, as the latter should not be studied on their own, but as building blocks of the 
larger framework. The restatement of the legal historian is in this view not a quasi codification of 
legal principles, but a reconstruction of the common framework of Rechtsgewohnheiten 
contemporary lawyers had in mind. 
 Anyone reading medieval charters may be forgiven for thinking that no such framework 
existed because no clear pattern seems to emerge from our sources. For example, there are many 
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texts describing the procedures followed when alienating a fief, but they are extremely bewildering 
in their variety. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think that the confusion in the sources means 
that contemporary lawyers were just as confused as we, as there are good explanations for the 
variations we find. First of all, the charters and narrative sources we use come from clergymen, 
outsiders. Generally, this is seen in terms of the distinction between laymen and clerics, but that 
would not be apt here. A monk may have been an outsider in the world of lords and vassals, but that 
was equally true for a merchant or a farmer. The best way to describe the situation is by using the 
concept of semi-autonomous social field which Sally Falk Moore developed for anthropological 
studies in Africa:31 between the state and the individual there are several social fields with their 
customs and rules. The society of lord and vassals is one such semi-autonomous field with its own 
specific elements. For any outsider it would have been hard fully to grasp the framework used in the 
field of feudal law, but it was even harder for clerics as they used texts to describe procedures which 
consisted of gestures and words. Moreover, for doing so their language was Latin which was foreign 
to the field of feudal law. In fact, a comparison of terminology in the vernacular shows how much of 
the chaos of the sources is due to a ‘translation’ in a framework alien to feudal law. In Middle Dutch 
and Ancient French clarity reigns. For example, there is one word for homage: oumage (French) or 
manscepe (Dutch), whereas the Latin scribes use several words.32 Add to this the transposition from 
gestures and oral proceedings to written text and even more possibilities for distortion of the original 
events arise.33 
That these followed a scenario is made clear by texts mentioning that the proceedings took 
place ‘ordine iudiciario’34 or ‘more curie’.35 Actually, the final element of the procedure before the 
feudal court was the court’s judgement that everything had happened in good order.36 Thereafter, it 
was impossible to attack the transfer of a fief because of deficiencies in the procedure. This means 
that the descriptions in our sources were irrelevant for contemporary lawyers. The only thing which 
counted was the judgement at the end and it is a sign of the ignorance of the scribes that they either 
did not mention this or paid attention to a lot of details which no longer mattered (even though at 
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1946), nr. 52, 579-580 (1238). 
least one feudal court helpfully indicated it was not necessary to give a detailed description).37 To 
make their judgement the members of the court, of course, needed to have some shared opinion of 
what constituted the proper procedure, so that they could use it as a stick. There was indeed a 
common framework of Rechtsgewohnheiten contemporary lawyers had in mind and it is possible to 
reconstruct it.  
 
The need to explain the limits of a restatement to historians 
 
 Writing a restatement of legal customs solves at least one problem for a legal historian in a 
law faculty: it ensures that his work is in a form that his colleagues can understand. Yet, for historians 
works of this kind can be even more useful. After all, most historians do not want a book about 
regional legal practices to be just as confused as the reality of the past. If it is, they are better off 
reading the sources for themselves. What they want is a book they can rely on to explain to them in a 
clear way what the common legal framework was, so that they can spend their time researching 
other aspects of past societies or elaborating the results of the studies of legal historians by looking 
at them with other eyes.  
However, legal historians have to explain clearly the limits of their approach to historians. 
The upshot of what is described above is not the holy statute book of the -medieval law of a certain 
region, which was slavishly followed by everyone whatever the circumstances. Any lawyer knows 
that even today, when statute-law has become so important, it is sometimes more of a guideline 
than a reality and that in the world of the practitioner anything is possible. The problem is that to 
legal historians, as lawyers, this is so evident that they do not always mention it, because even if their 
students did not notice this during their studies, they will soon do so when they are apprentices. 
Unfortunately, historians do not have this benefit (it is always strange to meet historians who work 
about courts and law, and who have never seen real lawyers and real courts in action) and many of 
them presume to know how lawyers think: there is a rule and that rule is blindly followed and 
applied by courts. Thus, they like to point out that the reality was very different from the handbooks 
of the legal historians, whereas to the latter this is so evident that it goes without saying. Many of the 
differences between Ganshof’s and Reynolds’s views of feudalism can easily be explained by taking 
this into account. This failure in communication, at times leads to odd results. For example, some 
historians of the Middle Ages are convinced that mediation and conciliation are very medieval,38 
which must sound strange in the ears of today’s lawyers who are promoting alternative dispute 
resolution. In short, it may seem superfluous to legal historians, but it is never a waste of paper to 
explain the limitations of their constructs. 
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The restatement as a contextual and integral legal history 
 
A restatement of a customary law uses legal customs as building-blocks and puts them in the 
shared framework of the lawyers, who worked in the context of the semi-autonomous field to which 
these customs belonged. Therefore, the legal historian should write a contextual history. However, 
this does not mean a legal history which takes all social, economic, political, cultural, religious and 
other elements into account, but one which looks for the peculiarities imposed by the legal context 
in the semi-autonomous field one studied. The best example one can give of this is the so-called 
impoverishment of the nobility in the late middle ages. In Flanders, for example, one can already find 
nobles selling their fiefs because of poverty in the early twelfth century39 and they were still doing so 
when the French Revolution finally abolished feudalism.40 One wonders how this impoverished 
nobility managed to hang on for centuries. The answer is that there is a difference between a 
chronicle which mentions that a noble had to sell his fiefs because of poverty41 and a charter, as the 
latter was written in the context of the feudal court which handled sales of fiefs. Flemish feudal law 
wanted to protect the interests of the family. To a certain extent, a vassal did not really own a fief, 
but held it in trust for the next generations. Thus, he could not give it away or even sell it without his 
heir’s consent. As usual, some exceptions existed, the main one being that a fief could be sold if the 
vassal was poor and had nothing else to sell.42 Needless to say, coming before the feudal court many 
a vassal suddenly claimed poverty and it could happen that his colleagues sitting on the court let him 
get away with it. After all, next time it could be their turn. Add to this, that there was a second 
justification for a sale without the heir’s consent: the profit one could make on the transaction, e.g. 
because the buyer offered a price higher than normal.43 Scribes did not always distinguish a sale 
because of poverty from one for profit and it could happen that the ‘impoverished noble’ actually 
became richer.44 Legal poverty could be very different from the real thing and could even turn into its 
opposite, but one becomes aware of this only if one takes the legal context into account. 
This legal context should be the whole framework as the legal historian should take into 
account all the legal elements within a certain semi-autonomous field because they interact. 
Contextual legal history thus becomes an integral history, not in the sense that all aspects of a society 
are studied, but only in the sense that all legal customs of a semi-autonomous legal field are studied, 
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as it would be too easy to miss certain causes and effects. For example, it would not be hard to make 
a study of feudal successions only, but then one would not see that its development is entwined with 
the history of local feudal courts in Flanders. In the middle of the twelfth century Flemish feudal law 
changed by imposing upon the eldest son who inherited all the fiefs, the obligation to provide for his 
siblings. This contributed to a heavier workload for the central feudal court of the county, the count’s 
curia, and led to the establishment of local comital feudal courts, who could relieve it of that burden. 
The local courts interpreted the original common custom in different ways, thus developing their 
own rules.45 Thus, a change in the law of succession contributed to an overhaul of the judicial 
organisation, which in its turn resulted in new legal rules concerning successions.  
A contextual, integral legal history of legal customs has to go further than its own ‘semi’-
autonomous field, as the latter is described so because it receives influences from other social fields. 
For example, in the thirteenth century the clerics tried to bring Roman law into the community of 
Flemish lords and vassals. They failed in their endeavour,46 but the renunciations of rights awarded 
by Roman law need to be studied, if only because the reaction of the society of lords and vassals to 
this first intrusion can teach much about its nature and its resistance to outside influences. At least 
one charter, in which the parties renounce all exceptions ‘invented or to be invented in the future’, 
makes clear that very soon Flemish feudal law got fed up with interference by clerics.47  
 
Conclusion 
 
 One may think of the approach proposed here as being limited, because it sticks to the legal 
context. This is true, but if a legal historian tries to study the complete legal context as sketched 
above, he will already have enough on his plate. It would be nice if he could study a broader context, 
but before he encroaches upon the terrain of others he should do his own job. The rest can be left to 
specialists of other aspects of history, ideally in a team of which the legal historian is a cherished 
member. Last but not least, all of the above is only valid for scholars confronted with the same 
documentary situation as this author when he started to study Flemish feudal law during the High 
Middle Ages and even for that subject there are many other, and equally rewarding, approaches. 
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